The CIA Intelligence Analyst by Roger Z. George and Robert Levine bring a new angle to the literature surrounding the mystique of intelligence analysis at the CIA. They discuss what really goes into being an intelligence analyst by specifying the work that characterizes each discipline. Read on for a Q&A with the editors about their work experience, potential chapters, and career advice.

What encouraged both of you to pursue intelligence analysis as a career?

Both of us studied international relations and defense policies as undergraduates and took graduate courses in defense and arms control policies of the 1970s and early 1980s. So we both had an interest in working in these areas. Likewise, we both felt the need to be in public service and wanted to understand how the US Government actually worked, as opposed to reading about it in textbooks. Intelligence offered us both an opportunity to see policy being made and to contribute to that process by analyzing and reporting on foreign developments to other parts of the US Government.

This book fills a literature gap by explaining what intelligence analysis really entails. What are some other angles or topics that you feel could contribute to a better understanding of the CIA’s analytic operations?

One area that has received insufficient attention is how to evaluate the quality of intelligence analysis. More has been written about using structured analytic techniques (SATs) to challenge ourselves and our judgments. But the field of product evaluation has attracted few scholars, and even fewer practitioners who worked in the area. We intend to help populate this field ourselves in an article we are currently working on for publication.

What chapters or disciplines would you have liked to include in this volume?

We had wanted to include a chapter on counter-narcotics analysis, which would share some of the same features and challenges as other disciplines like counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-intelligence (CI) analyses. In all these cases, analysis is more closely integrated with collection and policy actions than the more traditional disciplines, such as economic analysis. However, the counter-narcotics analytic field is arguably too small to justify its inclusion. A chapter on how analysis is used to support Covert Action proved elusive, due to rather obvious classification challenges (and the lack of declassified materials).

What was the greatest challenge you faced in writing and compiling this book?

The first challenge was determining if we could find experts who had the experience and writing skills necessary to address key aspects of each discipline—how analysis is conducted, how analysts work with sources and collectors, and how they interact with policymakers. After identifying potential contributors, we had to convince them that writing these chapters would make a substantial contribution to the field. Moreover, potential contributors had to be convinced that we had experience ferrying chapters through the CIA’s pre-publication review process. Without compromising intelligence sources and methods, we were able to guide the contributors in how they could address core issues with real examples and see their chapters move smoothly through [the] pre-publication process.

What would you propose as part of a solution to the issue of “short, journalistic items that do little more than report the classified news” as opposed to deeper analytical perspectives?

There are a range of product types beside the President’s Daily Brief and WIRe (those shorter forms of analysis) that analysts can prepare for consumers to dig more deeply into a topic. Part of the challenge is knowing how much information and time a consumer has—and what she needs to know. An on-line, classified library of available intelligence publications makes it easier now for consumers to identify and access longer-form analysis that meets their needs.

What do you hope is the main idea readers will take away from this book?

Readers should understand how intelligence analysis takes many forms and requires a wide range of skills, knowledge, and experiences to satisfy a dizzying number of civilian and military decision-makers. There is a mistake in over-generalizing how intelligence is conducted that many other textbooks often make. Our volume helps to unpack the analytic process (including the roles of analysis in collection and reaching decision makers) and highlight the range of backgrounds that analysts like ourselves bring to the diverse field of intelligence analysis.

What would your advice be to someone hoping to become an intelligence analyst?

First, a potential applicant needs to become a proficient and quick writer. Developing writing skills, learning how to re-write and critique one’s own writing, [and] being open to feedback are necessary elements of a successful analyst. Second, good writing has to be paired with good critical thinking skills. Developing logical thinking does not come automatically—it requires attention. Third, each analyst comes with a deep background in one or another field of study, be it a regional or functional area, a foreign area expertise or experience, and good interpersonal skills that one can use in cooperating with other analysts and collectors, and interacting with policymakers. Don’t neglect the value of learning a foreign language [or] culture, and developing skills in emerging technical areas. Some students make the mistake of concentrating undergraduate studies on “intelligence studies” rather than diving into academic fields of physics, chemistry, political science, or history—academic disciplines that give the potential analyst a foundation on which to build his or her analytic competence. Knowing who are the experts in one’s field outside of the government and knowing the academic literature can complement the classified information that the analyst will need to prepare insightful analysis and go beyond the news found elsewhere.