

# INTELLIGENCE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENTERPRISE

## INSTRUCTORS GUIDE AND SAMPLE SYLLABUS

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This course instructors guide is designed to facilitate the use of the new textbook, *Intelligence in the National Security Enterprise: An Introduction*. It includes some suggestions for how to use the book by chapter and topic. A sample syllabus as well as other suggested readings are included for two types of courses: (1) surveys of intelligence and national security; and (2) specialized courses about the formation and conduct of US national security. In both cases, the course instructions will illustrate how to use the textbook for explaining and illustrating the role that intelligence plays in the foreign policy decision-making process. The objective is to give students a better understanding of how intelligence functions in a democracy and of its inherent analytical, political, and ethical challenges.

### INSTRUCTOR GUIDANCE

A distinctive feature of *Intelligence in the National Security Enterprise* and the sample course syllabus is the inclusion of articles and book chapters by intelligence practitioners as well as excerpts from actual national security and intelligence documents. In this manner, the instructor can make the course as realistic as possible and not just a theoretical understanding of how intelligence serves policymakers.

### COURSE OBJECTIVES

Instructors may wish to define some course objectives in order to adjust their own approach to the study of intelligence and the use of this textbook and other readings. Consider the following:

- To understand how US intelligence was shaped by the Cold War and the post-Cold War foreign policies of a dozen different presidents.
- To appreciate the dilemmas that US decision-makers and intelligence managers face in utilizing secret intelligence capabilities, while also protecting American values and citizens' rights.
- To critique intelligence assessments in terms of their objectivity, accuracy, analytic methods, and utility to decision-makers.
- To develop an ability to assess and critique American intelligence collection and covert operations in terms of their utility, political acceptability, and consequences.
- To understand some of the challenges senior intelligence managers face in aligning intelligence priorities to suit changing presidential intelligence needs.

**TEXTS AND COURSE MATERIALS**

- Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: First Harper Perennial, 1996).
- Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2009).
- Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
- Erik Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Pearl Harbor* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
- Thomas Fingar, *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
- John Gentry and Joseph Gordon, *Strategic Warning: History, Challenges, and Prospects* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019).
- Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).
- Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017).
- Richards Jr. Heuer Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999).
- Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- Loch K. Johnson, *National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017).
- Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2017).
- Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark, eds., *The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2016).
- David Priess, *The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents from Kennedy to Obama* (New York: Public Affairs, 2016).
- Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., *Transforming US Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005).

Charles A. Stevenson, *America's Foreign Policy Toolkit: Key Institutions and Processes* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013).

Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

In addition, instructors could consider assigning some of these memoirs written by previous senior intelligence professionals, which could provide students with insights into the historical challenges and decisions made from the beginning of the Cold War to the present:

James Clapper, *Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence* (New York: Viking Press, 2018).

William Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*, with Peter Forbath (New York: Vintage Press, 1978).

Henry Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (New York: Penguin, 2012).

Jack Devine, *Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014).

Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spymaster on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World* (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2006).

Michael V. Hayden, *Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror* (New York: Penguin Books, 2016).

Richard Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003).

Michael Morell, *The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight against Terrorism—from al Qaeda to ISIS* (New York: Hachette, 2016).

George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

### SAMPLE COURSE READINGS

Journal articles on specific topics can be used to diversify and deepen the daily discussions by introducing different views. The most relevant and reliably accurate articles on intelligence practices are to be found in:

- *Intelligence and National Security (INS)*
- *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (IJIC)*
- *Studies in Intelligence (CIA)*

Government documents, including unclassified *National Security Strategies* on a range of topics, as well as declassified *National Intelligence Estimates* along with other IC publications are widely available at government websites and through non-governmental organizations such as the Federation of American Scientists ([FAS.org](http://FAS.org)), and the National Security Archive ([www.nsarchive.gwu.edu](http://www.nsarchive.gwu.edu)).

## WRITING ASSIGNMENTS

Instructors can develop a number of writing assignments to test students' comprehension of intelligence practices, organizations, and challenges throughout the course. Short essays might be assigned to compare and contrast cases of warning (Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the 9/11 attacks). Likewise, when examining cases of covert action like those in Iran in 1953, the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Afghanistan in 1979 and 2001, or the Bin Laden strike in 2011, students can be asked to assess the pros and cons of such actions. The major national estimate projects reviewed in this syllabus may also allow instructors to assign essays on some of those declassified projects. For ambitious instructors with some background in intelligence, it is possible to construct individual or group writing assignments that require students to use open source or declassified intelligence to prepare their own short intelligence assessments. Lastly, there would be opportunities for students to write research papers on past intelligence operations or estimates that explain the policy context and how successful those operations were in advancing US national security interests.

As courses will vary in length, instructors can pick and choose among the topics that might suit their needs and interests best. Some of the major issues covered in the syllabus are listed below:

- origins of US intelligence
- major collection disciplines, including HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, Open Source
- role and ethics of covert action, including successes and failures
- specific analytic functions of strategic intelligence, warning and current intelligence
- role and process of intelligence analysis—tradecraft, mind-sets, and biases
- intelligence-policy relationship—politicization and relevance
- legacy of Cold War intelligence
- key intelligence challenges, including cyber and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation

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## COURSE TOPICS AND SAMPLE READING ASSIGNMENTS

### Topic 1: Introduction and Context

This introductory session is an opportunity to explain the course, its readings, and other requirements as well as to introduce students to the peculiarities of intelligence. Selecting some current media reports on whatever national security topic is in the news and asking them to read it can begin the conversation about intelligence. You might also consider showing a variety of videos that outline some of the key elements of intelligence:

### Videos

- CIA Overview: <https://www.cia.gov/library/video-center>
- Science of Spying: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYMTPTFhYsU>
- Kim Philby, British Double Agent, Addresses East German Intelligence: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35943428>

### Readings

- Andrew, “From George Washington to the Twentieth Century,” in *For the President’s Eyes Only*, pp. 6–74
- George, Chapter 1, “How to Use this Book,” pp. 1–6.

### Document

- *US National Intelligence: An Overview*, 2011, Tabs 1–2, pp. –35, [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC\\_Consumers\\_Guide\\_2011.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf).

## Topic 2: Intelligence Missions and Functions

This session is devoted to introducing students to the terminology of intelligence: foreign intelligence (FI), counter-intelligence (CI), and covert action (CA). In addition, it explains a range of other concepts, principles, and methods of intelligence regarding how it is collected, analyzed, and then used by policymakers. Students also are introduced to the wide-range of definitions and meaning of intelligence.

### Readings

- George, Chapter 2, “What Is Intelligence?” pp. 7–24.
- Crumpton, “Recruiting,” “Collecting,” and “Liaising,” in *The Art of Intelligence*, pp. 39–66, 67–82, 8398.
- Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence,’” *Studies in Intelligence* 46, no. 3 (2002): pp. 15–22.

### Document

- *US National Intelligence: An Overview*, 2011, Tabs 3–4, pp. 39–56, [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC\\_Consumers\\_Guide\\_2011.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf).

## Topic 3: The National Security Enterprise

For courses on intelligence, this is a *must* section where students are exposed to the way US national security decision-making is traditionally conducted and how intelligence plays a role in this so-called interagency process. They will learn about how different presidents have structured their national security processes and selected their national security teams, depending on how comfortable and interested they were in foreign policy. The pros and cons of different approaches will be assessed. For courses on US foreign and security policy, this section can supplement what may already be covered in other readings.

*Readings*

- George, Chapter 3, “What Is the National Security Enterprise?” pp. 25-51.
- Jon Rosenwasser and Michael Warner, “History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States: Murphy’s Law?” in *The National Security Enterprise*, ed. George and Rishikof, pp. 13-31.
- Stevenson, “The President’s Toolkit,” in *America’s Foreign Policy Toolkit*, pp. 54-85.

*Document*

- *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

**Topic 4: The Intelligence Community’s Organizations and Their Cultures**

The US intelligence community is much broader and more diverse than just the CIA. Students will explore the dozen or more separate agencies, their functions and missions, and the particular set of “customers” they serve. Students are also introduced to the long history of trying to best organize these agencies into an effective intelligence community, with a focus on the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position in 2005.

*Readings*

- George, Chapter 4, “What Is the Intelligence Community?” pp. 52-83.
- George and Bruce, “The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis in the US Intelligence Community,” in *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2nd ed., pp. 23-37.

*Documents*

- *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America: 2014* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2014), [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014\\_NIS\\_Publication.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf).
- *Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1981), <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/executive-order-12333>.

**Topic 5: Strategic Intelligence and Its Uses**

This topic explores how strategic intelligence supports the national security enterprise by providing long-term, forward-looking “estimates” as well as other products for use in developing national security strategies. The role of the National Intelligence Council and the NIE are a focus, along with examination of some of the major challenges of producing useful national estimates. The infamous 2002 Iraq WMD NIE is examined for lessons on how to improve NIEs. The utility of the unclassified NIC Global Trends documents are also explored.

*Readings*

- George, Chapter 6, “Strategic Intelligence,” pp. 111-44

- Fingar, “Estimative Analysis: What It Is, What It Isn’t and How to Read It,” in *Reducing Uncertainty*, pp. 67–88.
- Paul Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2006.

#### Documents

- *National Intelligence Estimate: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2002), <http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html>.
- “Overview,” in *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: 2005), pp. 1–38: [https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd\\_report.pdf](https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf).
- *National Intelligence Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2007), [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203\\_release.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf).
- *Global Trends: Paradox of Progress* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2017), See “Future Summarized,” pp. ix–xi, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf>.

### Topic 6: The Warning Function—Origins of the CIA and the IC

Warning remains the single most critical function of the intelligence community, yet it is seldom well understood and not always well practiced. Students will delve into the requirements of good strategic warning and the difficulties of obtaining “tactical warning” in time to avert surprises. Classic cases of warning successes and failures are examined and some general causes are identified.

#### Readings

- George, Chapter 7, “The Challenges of Warning,” pp. 145–73.
- John Gentry and Joseph Gordon, “Concepts of Strategic Warning Intelligence,” in *Strategic Warning: History, Challenges, and Prospects* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), pp. 11–26.

#### Document

- *Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 85-3-62: The Military Buildup in Cuba* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1962), [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/89801/DOC\\_0000242425.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000242425.pdf).

#### Video

- Consider showing a variety of YouTube videos on the history of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy’s famous national address, or Adlai Stevenson’s presentation of intelligence to the UN Security Council. There is also *Thirteen Days* (2000), a commercially available film version of the Cuban Missile Crisis; the film “Fog of War” also contains sections on Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s views on the Cuban Missile Crisis.



Case Study: Pearl Harbor

- Andrew, “Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Path to Pearl Harbor,” “Roosevelt at War (1941-45),” and “Harry S. Truman (1945-53),” in *For the President’s Eyes Only*, pp. 75-122, 123-48, and 149-98.
- David Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/1992.
- Erik Dahl, “Pearl Harbor: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom,” in *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Pearl Harbor* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 29-46.

Case Study: Cuban Missile Crisis

- Andrew, “Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-61)” and “John F. Kennedy (1961-63),” in *For the President’s Eyes Only*, pp. 199-256 and 257-306.
- “A Crucial Estimate Relived,” in *Collected Essays*, Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003) <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/9crucial.html>.
- “A Look Back: Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Studies in Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2007), <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2007-featured-story-archive/a-look-back-remembering-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html>.

**Subtopic: Warning Compared—Pearl Harbor and 9/11**

Instructors may wish to expand this warning topic to several sessions and include discussion of the 9/11 attacks. It lends itself to comparison to the earlier failed warning at Pearl Harbor.

- Daniel Byman, “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks,” in *Secret Intelligence*, pp. 164-84.
- James Wirtz, “Déjà Vu? Comparing Pearl Harbor and September 11,” in *Secret Intelligence*, pp. 186-92.
- Betts, “Two Faces of Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD,” in *Enemies of Intelligence*, pp. 104-23.

Document

- *The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary* (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report\\_Exec.pdf](http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.pdf).

**Topic 7: Intelligence Analysis—Mind-set Problems and Tradecraft Solutions**

For intelligence courses, the analytical methods and processes used to develop finished analysis are crucial topics. Students need to understand the cognitive processes that go into making intelligence judgments and the many ways in which analysts can misinterpret information or use outmoded “mental models” in assessing the likely behavior of foreign leaders and governments. This topic explores those cognitive traps and also looks at analytical tradecraft methods to guard against them.



### Readings

- George, Chapter 5, “From Intelligence Cycle to Policy Support,” pp. 84-110.
- George and Bruce, “The Track Record of CIA Analysis,” “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” and “The Missing Link: The Analyst–Collector Relationship,” in *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2nd ed., pp. 39-56, 121-34, and 157-77.
- Richards Heuer Jr., *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), pp. 1-17, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf>.

### Document

- *US National Intelligence: An Overview, 2011*, Tab 5, “Analysis, Production and Feedback,” pp. 59-66, [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC\\_Consumers\\_Guide\\_2011.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf).

## Topic 8: Current Intelligence—Direct Policy Support

The bulk of what passes for policy support is typically described as current intelligence analysis in which daily updates of significant events are conveyed via written products and briefings. Other forms of current, direct support include targeting analysis, support to US negotiations, and crisis task force support. This topic explores those forms of direct, daily support and also highlights some of the challenges and drawbacks of allowing current analysis to crowd out longer-term, strategic intelligence research.

### Readings

- George, Chapter 8, “Intelligence Support as Policy Enabler,” pp. 174-204.
- Michael Morell, “11 September 2001: With the President,” *Studies in Intelligence* 50, no. 3 (2009): 23-34, [http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB493/docs/intell\\_ebb\\_022.PDF](http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB493/docs/intell_ebb_022.PDF).
- David Priess, “The Good Stuff,” in *The President’s Book of Secrets*, pp. 223-52.

### Document

- President’s Daily Brief, *Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US*, August 6, 2001, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/pdb8-6-2001.pdf>.

## Topic 9: Policy Support—Bosnia Case Study

This is a case study of how intelligence supported the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations from 1990 to 1995. The readings allow the instructor to illustrate how strategic estimates written in 1990 and 1992 impacted the two presidencies. They also explore how the Clinton administration’s focus on Bosnia led to the development of close working relationships between policymakers and the special Balkan Task Force set up both to support senior officials monitoring the military conflict and the sanctions regime against Serbia and to backstop negotiations leading to the December 1995 Dayton Accords. Extensive declassified policy directives and intelligence assessments permit the instructor to demonstrate the close working relationship between intelligence and policy.

*Readings*

- Warren Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1995.
- Gregory F. Treverton and Renanah Miles, *Unheeded Warning of War: Why Policymakers Ignored the 1990 Yugoslavia Estimate* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2015), <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/csi-intelligence-and-policy-monographs/pdfs/unheeded-warning-yugoslavia-NIE.pdf>.
- William J. Clinton Presidential Library, *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency: The Role of Intelligence and Political Leadership in Ending the Bosnian War*, CIA Library Publication’s Historical Collections, October 2013, [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/international-relations/bosnia-intelligence-and-the-clinton-presidency/Clinton\\_Bosnia\\_Booklet.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/international-relations/bosnia-intelligence-and-the-clinton-presidency/Clinton_Bosnia_Booklet.pdf).

*Documents*

- *National Intelligence Estimate (15-90): Yugoslavia Transformed* (Washington, DC: National Foreign Intelligence Board, 1990), <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1990-10-01.pdf>.
- *National Intelligence Estimate (29-15-92): The Broadening Balkan Crisis* (Washington, DC: National Foreign Intelligence Board, 1992), <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5235e80d993294098d517508>.
- *Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1: US Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia* (Washington, DC: CIA Historical Collections, January 1993) <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1993-01-22.pdf>.

**Topic 10: Covert Action as Policy Support**

Among the forms of policy support, covert action stands out as a unique and controversial instrument that intelligence provides to US national security policy. By law, only the president can approve covert actions conducted by the CIA, so intelligence takes on a special policy-implementing role through the covert use of political, economic, informational, and military tools to achieve US objectives. This topic will explore the ways covert action has been used successfully and unsuccessfully and also describe how such actions are planned by the CIA, approved by the president, and then notified to the Congress.

*Readings*

- George, Chapter 9 “Covert Action as Policy Support,” pp. 205–33.
- Crumpton, “Counterterrorism,” “Federal Bureau of Investigation,” and “The Counterterrorism Center,” in *The Art of Intelligence*, pp. 99–104, 105–20, 121–69.
- André Le Gallo, “Covert Action: A Vital Option in US National Security Policy,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18, no. 2 (2005): pp. 354–59.
- Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, “The Logic of Covert Action,” *National Interest*, March 1, 1998, <https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-logic-of-covert-action-333>.
- Ron Rosenbaum, “Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack,” *Smithsonian*

*Magazine*, April 2012, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/richard-clarke-on-who-was-behind-the-stuxnet-attack-160630516/>.

#### Document

- “Note on US Covert Action Programs,” in *Documents on American Republics, 1969-72 (Foreign Relations of the US, 1969-1976, Volume E-10)* (Washington, DC: US Department of State Office of the Historian), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/actionsstatement>.

### Topic 11: Intelligence and the Policymaker Relationship

The intelligence-policy relationship is embedded in virtually every part of the intelligence business, but this topic focuses on some of the challenges of making the relationship work. Attention is provided to the different cultures separating policymakers from intelligence officers and the inherent tension that exists between those senior officials whose job is to achieve results and are prone to expecting to succeed and those intelligence officials who must present incomplete information and often bad news. Cases of “politicization” will be examined and some of the ways to ameliorate such problems.

#### Readings

- Andrew, “Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-69)” and “Richard M. Nixon (1969-74),” in *For the President’s Eyes Only*, pp. 307-49 and 350-96.
- George, Chapter 10, “The Challenges of the Intelligence-Policy Relationship,” pp. 234-64.
- George and Bruce, “The Track Record of CIA Analysis,” “Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?” “Serving the National Policymaker,” and “Building a Community of Analysts,” in *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2nd ed., pp. 39-55, 57-77, 81-91, 287-301.
- Gregory Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis: Between ‘Politicization’ and Irrelevance,” in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, (2008), pp. 91-104.
- Glenn Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience,” *Intelligence and National Security* 28, no. 1 (2013): pp. 5-31.

#### Case Study: Vietnam

- Harold P. Ford, “The Three Episodes in Perspective,” in *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2007) <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-and-the-vietnam-policymakers-three-episodes-1962-1968/epis3a.html>
- James J. Wirtz, “Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 2 (Summer 1991): pp. 239-63.
- *US National Intelligence: An Overview Estimate (53-66): Problems of Political Developments in South Vietnam over the Next Year or So* (Washington, DC: United States Intelligence Board, December 1966), [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/89801/DOC\\_0001166478.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001166478.pdf).

**Topic 12: Intelligence Oversight, Ethics, and Reforms**

Intelligence frequently evokes public qualms about how covert operations and information-gathering are contrary to democratic principles. To deal with this challenge the American government has established an elaborate set of controls over the collection and use of information. This topic examines these tools for oversight in the executive and legislative branches, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of those systems. In addition, this topic asks students to wrestle with the “ethics” of intelligence operations: When is it appropriate to spy on foreign governments and leaders, and when is the use of secret methods inappropriate? US policymakers and intelligence officials face these challenges daily, and must search for the right balance between conducting intelligence to protect the public and the rights of Americans to their privacy. The topic is often a good way to end a course, by bringing it back to first principles of “why we spy.”

*Readings*

- Andrew, “Gerald R. Ford (1974–77),” “Jimmy Carter (1977–81),” and “Ronald Reagan (1981–89),” in *For the President’s Eyes Only*, pp. 397–424, 425–456, and 457–503.
- George, Chapter 11, “American Intelligence and Democracy,” pp. 265–94.
- Michael Herman, “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 2 (2004), pp. 343–58.
- William M. Nolte, “Ethics and Intelligence,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 54, 3rd Quarter (2009): pp. 22–29.

*Documents*

- *US National Intelligence: An Overview, 2011*, Tab 6, pp. 67–71, [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC\\_Consumers\\_Guide\\_2011.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf).
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report of the SSCI Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program* (Washington, DC: US Senate, December 2014), <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf>.

**Topic 13: Cyber and Intelligence**

The intelligence community has become more involved in and dependent on cyber operations to conduct foreign intelligence collection and guard against foreign intelligence intrusions via cyber operations. While the subject is still shrouded in secrecy, recent cases of cyber espionage and cyber intrusions like the Russian interference into the 2016 presidential election make it clear that cyber operations is now a major challenge. The DNI’s worldwide threat assessment places cyber at the top of the list of major threats, listing Russia, China, and Iran among those most likely conducting cyber operations against the United States. This topic explores how the cyber threat has changed and how the US intelligence community is attempting to exploit cyber space as well as defend against foreign cyber operations.

*Readings*

- Eric A. Fischer, *Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Report No. R43831, August 2016), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43831.pdf>.

- Jeffrey Carr, “The Rise of the Non-State Hacker,” in *Inside Cyber Warfare* (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, 2011), pp. 15–30.
- David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyber Attacks on Iran,” *The New York Times*, June 1, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html>.
- Jane Mayer, “How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump,” *The New Yorker*, September 24, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia-helped-to-swing-the-election-for-trump>.

#### Document

- US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution* (Washington, DC: Office of Director of National Intelligence, January 2017), See Background (pp. 1–2) and Key Judgments (pp. i–iii). [https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ICA\\_2017\\_01.pdf](https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).

### Topic 14: WMD Proliferation

Proliferation has been a top intelligence community priority ever since the Soviet Union and China got “the bomb.” The methods used by the intelligence community to detect, monitor, and interrupt proliferation networks are similar to other intelligence analytic processes, but they take on more urgency and involve active targeting and disruption of those networks, not just assessing the major proliferation threats. This topic uses case studies to explore how intelligence attempts to combat proliferation and some of the challenges it faces in doing so.

#### Readings

- Thomas Graham and Keith Hansen, “Detecting and Monitoring Clandestine WMD Programs” and “The Track Record against Clandestine Proliferation,” in *Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 22–42 and 43–87.
- Henry Sokolski, “Improving the Role of Intelligence in Counterproliferation Policymaking: Report of the ‘Speaking Truth to Nonproliferation Project,’ 2018,” *Studies in Intelligence* 63, no. 1 (2018): pp. 1–8, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-63-no-1/pdfs/NuclearProliferationChallenge.pdf>.
- Wyn Q. Bowen, Robert Dover, and Michael S. Goodman, “Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: An Introduction to the Special Issue,” *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no 3 (2014): pp. 315–22.

#### Case Study: Iran’s Nuclear Program

- *Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Report No. R40094, August 2016), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40094.pdf>

- Robert Zarate, “The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran,” *Nonproliferation Policy Education Center*, April 2013, <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1195%26tid=4>.

#### Case Study: North Korea’s Nuclear Program

- Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., *North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Report No. R41259, January 2016), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf>.
- Shane Smith, *North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy* (Washington, DC: US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2015), <http://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/627072/north-koreas-evolving-nuclear-strategy/>.

#### Case Study: Libya’s Nuclear Program

- William Tobey, “Cooperation in the Libya WMD Disarmament Case,” *Studies in Intelligence* 61, no. 4 (Extracts, December 2017): pp. 31–42, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-61-no-4/pdfs/libya-nuclear-deal.pdf>.

#### Case Study: A Q Khan Network

- David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2005): pp. 109–28.

### **Topic 15: Homeland Security and Terrorism**

Since the 9/11 attacks, counterterrorism has held a primary position on the intelligence community’s list of major threats and intelligence targets. The establishment of the DNI, DHS, and a host of centers for fusing intelligence and law enforcement information into actionable intelligence has been a high priority. This topic explores how counterterrorism intelligence is performed and some of the legal, ethical, and analytical challenges of conducting it.

#### *Readings*

- George and Bruce, “Domestic Intelligence Analysis,” in *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2nd ed., pp. 265–84.
- Crumpton, “Counterterrorism,” “Federal Bureau of Investigation,” and “The Counterterrorism Center,” in *The Art of Intelligence*, pp. 99–104, 105–20, 121–69.
- Daniel Byman, “The Intelligence War on Terrorism,” *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no. 6 (2014): pp. 837–63, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.851876>.
- Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2013.
- Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013.

#### *Document*

- White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America, October 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf>.