Gudrun Persson - Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War
Gudrun Persson’s Russian Military Thought uniquely challenges fundamental misunderstandings of Russian strategic thought and expands an understudied field of knowledge. Persson has used Russian-language primary sources, archival research, and a rich analysis of the two to contribute to new understandings of Russian doctrine, strategy, and patterns. Read on for a Q&A with the author to learn more about her research process and her unique perspectives.
The book opens with the idea that there is a Western “ignorance and misunderstanding” surrounding Russian strategic thought. Why do you think this is, and what do you believe is the greatest misunderstanding that should be debunked?
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and in the years of globalization and terrorism, it seems to me that Russia in general was seen as irrelevant both by policy makers in the West and in academia. Therefore, Russian strategic thought has largely been ignored in the West, although it is a vital subject that goes to the very heart of the Russian state. It reflects Russia’s self-image and search for a national identity, which in turn has significant consequences in Russia and, not least, for its neighbors. In addition, the Russian view of strategy is much broader than recognized in the West, which, again, often leads to the latter’s bewilderment. In order to grasp the mindset of the current Russian leadership, we must understand the evolution of strategic thought in Russia.
What was the most interesting thing you learned during your research?
It showed how continuities can be so persistent. Perhaps naively, I had expected more change between the mid-19th century and today, especially considering political, economic, and social upheavals with the fall of the czarist empire in 1917 and then the Soviet one in 1991. There have been at least three major attempts during these 160 years to revise the doctrine and strategy to a more defensive posture, but there was never enough time for these ideas to mature. Also, it became clear to me that Russia primarily acts for its own reasons and national interests (despite Russian rhetoric to the contrary), not necessarily as a reaction to Western actions. Domestic factors, such as fear of uprisings and the strategic calculations of waging the war away from the Russian heartland, influence Russian strategic thought to a large degree.
Were there any particular challenges you encountered during your research process?
I had written about half of the book when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, but then I had to set it aside to focus on current events. My editor was very patient when I missed my deadlines. I did not need to re-write the book, but I did add a section on the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and I pointed out the context of Russian strategic thought.
Which source materials (war plans, Voennaia mysl, Rossiiskii voennyi sbornik, individual memoirs, etc.) were most helpful to you and your development of the book?
As a scholar, I really like archival research. But I am also aware that you cannot rely solely on documents in archives, and I have used articles and books as primary sources in addition to secondary literature. Context is key when you write a book like this, exploring continuities and change within Russian strategic thought.
What is the most unique perspective the book offers readers?
This book offers a concise and systematic analysis of the evolution of Russian strategic thought, which is a complex topic. I hope it offers the reader not only a structured understanding of continuity and change in Russian strategic thought, but also new perspectives on strategy, military history, and Russian history in general. After all, the military system of any state is a reflection of the political system, as also related to its culture and society.